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Abstract In biology, the evolution of increasingly cooperative groups has shaped the
history of life. Genes collaborate in the control of cells; cells efficiently divide tasks
to produce cohesive multicellular individuals; individual members of insect colonies
cooperate in integrated societies. Biological cooperation provides a foundation on
which to understand human behavior. Conceptually, the economics of efficient al-
location and the game-like processes of strategy are well understood in biology; we
find the same essential processes in many successful theories of human sociality.
Historically, the trace of biological evolution informs in two ways. First, the evolu-
tionary transformations in biological cooperation provide insight into how economic
and strategic processes play out over time—a source of analogy that, when applied
thoughtfully, aids analysis of human sociality. Second, humans arose from biologi-
cal history—a factual account of the past that tells us much about the material basis
of human behavior. [Preprint of article published as: Frank, S. A. 2009. Evolution-
ary foundations of cooperation and group cohesion. Pages 3–40 in Games, Groups,
and the Global Good. S. A. Levin, ed. Springer-Verlag.]
1 Introduction
People change their behavior in relation to what others do. The way in which in-
dividual behavior changes in relation to others calls upon understanding the evolu-
tionary dynamics of populations. By “evolutionary,” I simply mean the tendency for
successful behaviors to increase in frequency.
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2 S. A. Frank
Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of behavior developed through a long
history of study in economics, in game theory, and in evolutionary biology. The
common theme in all fields derives from analysis of self interested actors.
In economics and game theory, notions of self interest and utility can be prob-
lematic; the theory applies to the extent that one accepts certain assumptions about
these notions of the individual. By contrast, a simple measure of self interest arises
inevitably in biology from the basic facts of heredity and reproduction: those traits
associated with relatively less reproduction have been outcompeted and have disap-
peared. Heredity also provides a clear notion of continuity through time, an essential
point in the study of behavioral dynamics.
The clear advantage of biology with regard to the application of evolutionary
dynamics led the great statistician and evolutionary biologist R. A. Fisher to say in
a 1928 letter to Darwin’s son, Leonard:
An engineer finds among mammals and birds really marvelous achievements in his craft, but
the vascular system of the higher plants . . . has apparently made no considerable progress.
Is it like a First Law, not a great engineering achievement, but better than anything else for
the price? Are the plants not perhaps the real adherents of the doctrine of marginal utility,
which seems to be too subtle for man to live up to? (Fisher, 1983, p. 94)
In other words, evolutionary dynamics of individual interests works beautifully
to explain biology, but for humans, the problem appears more complex. From which,
many people conclude that the evolutionary dynamics of self interest teaches us little
about humans. I draw different conclusions.
On the theoretical side, evolutionary dynamics achieves its greatest development
and clarity in biology, because of the clear notions of self interest and continuity
through time. I will therefore develop the evolutionary dynamics of conflict and
cooperation within the biological frame, but in a general way that does not depend
specifically on biology. The principles should therefore provide a solid foundation
for the application to human behavior.
On the applied side, understanding the evolutionary dynamics of human behavior
is not easy, but should not be abandoned. Self interest, for all the problems one may
wish to raise, remains a powerful theoretical framework in which to analyze human
behavior. Several chapters in this book discuss recent progress and application. A
common view is that, to engineer a social environment that achieves a certain moral
goal, such as reduction in hostility or design of fair laws, one must understand the
social dynamics in play. In fact, engineering and dynamics always go together: to
control the outcome of a system, one must understand the dynamics of that system.
By this view, evolutionary dynamics and moral engineering are natural partners.
The first part of my paper, on the evolutionary dynamics of conflict and cooper-
ation, provides basic tools that apply across the disciplines of biology, economics,
and game theory. I then turn to a second aspect of evolutionary dynamics: the biolog-
ical history of evolution. How has the tension between conflict and cooperation—
between individual and group—shaped the history of life?
One may view this biological history in various ways. It may be a source of
analogy about the dynamical processes that govern human sociality, but similarity
arises only through a vague analogy of change in populations. Or biology may define
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our history in fundamental ways, because we derive from this history and have been
shaped by it in nearly every aspect. Or, as many humanists prefer, we must maintain
a sharp divide between biological history and our understanding of human morality.
I prefer to think of biological history as both a source of interesting analogy about
human affairs and an essential part of our history. I sketch the connections and the
limitations that arise from these lines of thought. I leave the reader with a series of
questions about how much biological analogy and biological history explain modern
human sociality.
2 Scope
Misunderstanding arises frequently with the words “evolutionary” and “moral.” I
delimit my scope before proceeding.
I described two distinct meanings of “evolutionary” in the introduction. The first
meaning concerns the change in a population over time. Any economic or game
theoretic study that aims to understand human behavior must, at least implicitly,
be evolutionary. At any point in time, each individual has a certain probability dis-
tribution over possible behaviors. As time progresses, each individual’s behavioral
distribution may change in response to the factors under study. These simple points
alone provide the necessary conditions for the population dynamics of behavior to
form an evolutionary system. From a purely logical or formal perspective, such evo-
lutionary dynamics of behavior do not differ from biological evolution, although
the particular rules of continuity and change inevitably differ between particular
economic and biological problems.
The second meaning of “evolutionary” concerns the specific facts of evolutionary
history. How did humans evolve? How have our brains been shaped by our past his-
tory? What consequences does that past evolutionary history have for understanding
the behavior of modern humans?
With regard to “moral,” I consider two distinct positions that parallel the two
types of evolutionary analysis. First, whatever one takes to be the scope of moral
studies, most issues concern individual attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors that may
change over time in response to those attributes in other members of the population—
an evolutionary problem. Often the issues will turn on some aspect of life that comes
down to conflict or cooperation, and what this book labels as the “global good.”
Second, the particular facts of evolutionary history may help us to understand the
dynamics of moral issues. Such insight may come purely by way of analogy. For
example, the theory of justice introduced in Adam Smith’s Moral Sentiments and
developed by John Rawls forms a very close analogy with one of the fundamental
processes that shaped cooperation in biological history (Alexander, 1987; Leigh,
1991; Skyrms, 1996; Frank, 2003). Alternatively, and more controversially, insight
may follow from the particular ways in which humans have been designed by natural
selection through our evolutionary history.
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3 Evolutionary Dynamics
I start with the simplest force that favors cooperative evolution, the tendency for
similar behaviors to interact. In the second section I discuss repression of compe-
tition, in which reduced opportunities for conflict make cooperation the only way
in which to increase payoff. In the third section I consider correlated interests be-
tween individuals, in which an actor places some value on the consequences to those
who receive the outcome of the behavior. In the fourth section I turn to synergism,
the positive interaction or feedback between cooperative behaviors with respect to
payoff.
3.1 Correlated Behaviors and Information about Social Partners
I start with a simple example to focus the problem. Suppose a group depends on a
common resource—the commons. That resource may be land that supports farming
or a forest that supports wild food products. The total success of the group depends
on the long-term flow of goods from the common resource. Prudent exploitation
maximizes long-term flow and group good; overexploitation reduces long-term flow
and group success.
A self interested individual gains according to two distinct components of suc-
cess. First, that individual gains a particular share of the local resource. Second, the
value of the individual’s share depends on the total value of the local resource.
The essential tension of sociality arises from the conflict between an individual’s
local share and the resource’s total value. An individual always increases its share
of the common resource by competing more strongly against neighbors. However,
increased competition leads to over-exploitation of the resource, reducing long-term
gain and lowering everyone’s success. Self interested individuals tend to overexploit
the common resource, leading to the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).
I developed a simple evolutionary model of the tragedy of the commons (Frank,
1994b, 1995a, 1998). This model highlights in a clear way the two key forces that
can overcome the tragedy of the commons: correlated behaviors between social part-
ners and repression of competition. In this section, I discuss correlated behaviors in
terms of information about social partners. In the following section, I analyze re-
pression of competition as the second key force that can promote group cohesion
and prudent exploitation of shared resources.
3.1.1 A Simple Model
Suppose the world is divided into local groups. Each group has its own common re-
source, available only to members of that local group. We seek the behavior adopted
by self interested individuals. We find that behavior by searching for a situation in
which, if everyone adopted a particular behavior or nearly so, then no self interested
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individual could do better by deviating from the population norm (Maynard Smith,
1982).
I measure individual behavior by the degree to which an individual exploits the
common resource. Values range from 0 to 1. Higher values represent greater indi-
vidual exploitation; lower values represent more prudent and cooperative individual
behavior with regard to the long-term value of the shared resource.
I seek the population-wide value of behavior, z∗, such that anyone who deviates
does worse. To find that value, I measure the behavior of individuals who deviate
as I − z∗ = δ , where δ is a random variable that measures individual deviation.
Each individual lives in a local group. If we focus on a particular individual within
a group, and set that individual’s deviation to δ = x, then we can use the theory
of least squares to write the optimal prediction for group deviation, G, given the
individual deviation as (Frank, 1998)
E(G|δ = x)− z∗ = rx. (1)
We read this as: given an individual’s particular behavioral deviation, x, the expected
deviation of that individual’s group is rx, where r is the regression of the average
group behavior on individual behavior. In this case, the regression is equivalent to
the correlation between behaviors of members in a group. This correlation is just a
description of pattern without implication about mechanism: we simply note that,
given a particular individual deviation, the group deviates to the extent that individ-
ual and group behavior are correlated. Put another way, r measures an individual’s
information about social partners given the value of the individual’s own behavior.
Individual success depends on the product of two components. First, measure
an individual’s share of the local resource as f (I,G), where I is the individual’s
competitive grab for local share, and G is the local average competitiveness. The
function f rises with I and declines with G, because an individual’s competitiveness
raises its local share, and group competitiveness shrinks its local share. Second,
measure the long-term value of the local resource as h(G), in which long-term value
declines as group competitiveness increases. Thus, we can write individual success
as
W = f (I,G)h(G), (2)
where it would be better to write this expression as the expected payoff given an
individual’s behavioral deviation, E(W |δ = x), but for simplicity I just write W .
We analyze how payoff changes with individual behavior by
dW
dx
= fxh+ r( f hy+ fyh) (3)
=−Cm+ rBm, (4)
where subscripts denote partial differentiation with respect to that variable, and y=
rx is the group deviation (Taylor and Frank, 1996; Frank, 1998). In Equation (3), the
first term, fxh, is the marginal change in an individual’s share of the local resource
as the individual behavioral deviation, x, changes. This measures the direct effect of
6 S. A. Frank
an individual’s behavior on success, holding constant how the individual’s behavior
correlates with the average competitiveness of neighbors and the value of the group
resource. By convention, we call this direct effect of an individual’s behavior on
success the marginal cost of cooperation, Cm. In this case, Cm = − fxh, where the
minus sign arises because cooperation means a decrease in competitiveness, that is,
a decrease in x.
The second term on the right side of Equation (3) has two parts. First, f hy mea-
sures the consequences of the marginal increase in the group resource as competi-
tion within the group decreases, that is, as the group deviation, y = rx, decreases.
Second, fyh measures the consequences of the marginal decrease in the competitive
pressure imposed by neighbors as the group deviation decreases. By convention,
Bm measures the way in which a marginal increase in cooperative behavior among
neighbors affects marginal change in individual success. This marginal benefit term,
Bm, is weighted by r, because group behavior changes at a rate r relative to a change
in individual behavior. Thus, r functions as an exchange rate between the marginal
costs of individual cooperative behavior and the marginal gains of group coopera-
tive behavior, rendering the costs and benefits on the common scale of individual
payoff.
The condition for evolutionary dynamics to favor an increase in an individual
behavior requires that the change in payoff with an increase in behavioral deviation
be greater than zero, that is, dW/dx> 0, which also means that
rBm−Cm > 0, (5)
an inequality known as Hamilton’s rule in biology (Frank, 2006, see Equation (15)
below). In a moment, I discuss the importance of r, the group correlation. But first,
I look at the outcome of the tragedy of the commons in a very simple case.
In Equation (2), let f = I/G, which means that an individual’s share of the local
resource is proportional to its competitiveness, I, divided by the average compet-
itiveness of members of the local group, G. Let h = 1−G, which means that the
value of the group resource decreases linearly with the average competitiveness of
group members, yielding
W =
I
G
(1−G), (6)
or
E(W |δ = x) = z
∗+ x
z∗+ rx
(1− z∗− rx). (7)
With these assumptions, the behavior that, once nearly adopted by everyone, cannot
be improved with regard to individual payoff is
z∗ = 1− r, (8)
obtained by solving dE(W |δ = x)/dx= 0 evaluated at x= 0, as described in Frank
(1994b, 1995a, 1998). Clearly, as the correlation between social partners, r, in-
creases, individual competitiveness, z, declines, or, equivalently, individual coop-
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erative behavior increases and enhances the long-term prudent harvesting of the
common resource.
3.1.2 Interpretation of Group Correlation
In this model, the severity of the tragedy depends on the behavioral correlation be-
tween group members. If, for example, group members are perfectly correlated,
then they all have the same behavioral level of competitiveness, and no one can out-
compete a neighbor. If no gains can be had at a neighbor’s expense, then the only
way to increase individual gain is by increasing the value of the common good. As
the correlation, r, between neighbors declines, opportunity to outcompete neighbors
rises, and each individual is favored to raise its competitive efforts even though the
outcome is worse for all.
This model does not assume or depend on any particular mechanism that im-
poses correlation in the behavior between group members. In biology, the clas-
sical interpretation is that correlated behavior arises from correlated genes, usu-
ally between genetic relatives derived from recently shared ancestors. In a sim-
ple case, siblings would be genetically correlated by one-half. To calculate r in
this case, note that, in a group of size N, the individual itself composes a fraction
1/N of the group, and an individual is correlated to itself by one. So, for siblings,
r = (1/N)1+[(N−1)/N](1/2).
Correlation does not require genetics and shared genealogy. Individuals may
choose correlated social partners. Individual choice of where to live may be cor-
related with behavior, so that those living in a particular place tend to behave in a
correlated manner. Or, there may be some extrinsic force that imposes behavioral
correlation.
The notion of information about social partners is very general (Aumann, 1974,
1987). With genetic relatedness in biology, individuals do not necessarily “know”
or have direct information about the behavior of their partners. Rather, if an individ-
ual happens to live near correlated individuals, then natural selection will favor those
behaviors that exploit the correlations. By the evolutionary process, the existing cor-
relation becomes exploited as information, and the resulting behavior is shaped in
accord with that information (Binmore, 1994; Pollack, 1996; Skyrms, 1996; Frank,
1998, 2006). In humans, the evolutionary dynamics of behavioral adjustment may
be complex. But, as long as individuals seek self interest by some process of trial
and error, they may often come to settle on behaviors that exploit existing corre-
lations: the invisible hand may come to discover and use information about social
partners without conscious knowledge of those associations. Alternatively, direct
and conscious information may come into play in some cases.
The point here is that behavioral correlations often shape conflict and coopera-
tion more powerfully than any other process. The next section turns to mechanisms
that may escape the tragedy of the commons when the intrinsic behavioral correla-
tions are low. In that case, some secondary force must impose correlation to bring
individual interests in line.
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3.2 Repression of Competition
The simple tragedy of the commons model in Equation (6) illustrates well the great
importance of behavioral correlation. Self interested individuals compete at a level
z∗ = 1− r, where r is the behavioral correlation among members of a group. As
the correlation declines, competition becomes more severe, and shared resources
become over-exploited to the detriment of all.
If some mechanism creates strong correlations within groups, then self interested
individuals naturally adjust their behavior to cooperative ends. In the absence of in-
trinsic correlation, behavior tends to be competitive and mutually destructive. So, in
the absence of an intrinsic correlation, what additional force can bring the interests
of the competitive group members into line and thereby improve everyone’s lot?
One possibility is that the self interested members of the group would gain by in-
vesting some of their own resources in mechanisms that repress competition in their
group. Such policing of competition, by reducing the opportunities for individual
gain against neighbors, would have the effect of imposing greater correlation among
group members in the payoffs they receive. As mechanisms that level opportunities
for individual gain intensify, individual payoffs become increasingly correlated with
other group members independently of the resources that each individual invests in
selfish and competitive behaviors (Alexander, 1979, 1987; Leigh, 1991; Skyrms,
1996; Frank, 2003, see these references for connections to notions of fairness and
justice discussed by Adam Smith and John Rawls).
I focus on a simple extension of the tragedy of the commons model from the
previous section, in which I add a second behavioral character that determines the
extent to which individuals contribute their own resources to repressing selfish, com-
petitive behaviors within their group (Frank, 1995a, 1996c).
In the previous section, I used a simple payoff function to describe the tragedy of
the commons
W =
I
G
(1−G), (9)
where I is the intensity at which an individual competes against neighbors for a
share of the local resources, and G is the average intensity of competition within a
group. I extend that model by adding a second behavior expressed by each individ-
ual, A, the amount an individual invests in mechanisms that police and repress local
competition in the group, with 0 ≤ A ≤ 1. The average investment in policing per
group member is P. With this second character that represses competition, we can
now express individual payoff as
W = (1− cA)[P− (1−P)(I/G)][1− (1−P)G]. (10)
The first term applies a discount to individual success for the cost of investment
in the public good through the policing mechanism, where c is the cost per unit
investment in policing, A.
The second term is the individual’s competitive success against neighbors for
obtaining a share of local resources: a fraction P of local resources are distributed
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evenly to all group members, where 0≤ P≤ 1 is the average level of investment in
the mechanisms that repress competition; a fraction 1−P of local resources remains
available for splitting by competitive interactions, of which the focal individual ac-
quires its share in proportion to I/G, given by the relative competitiveness of an
individual, I, compared with the average level of competitiveness in the group, G.
The third term quantifies the long-term value of the shared resource. As before,
the resource value declines with local competition. In this case, G is the average
latent competitiveness of individuals, but only a fraction 1−P of that competitive-
ness can be expressed, because local policing represses a fraction P of competitive
behavior.
We need to find the values of the two behaviors, competitiveness and policing,
such that when the population adopts the values (z∗,a∗), no individual that deviates
can do better. I discussed the details in Frank (1995a, 1996c); here I give a brief
summary. As before, the correlations in behavior among group members play a key
role. Here, rz is the correlation in competitive values between a randomly chosen
individual and the group average, and ra is the correlation in the amount invested in
policing between a randomly chosen group member and the group average.
With regard to competitive behavior, self interested individuals are favored to
express a level
z∗ =
1− rz
1−a∗(1− rz) . (11)
The numerator is the solution for the simple tragedy of the commons model as
given in Equation (8). The denominator term, a∗(1− rz), accounts for the amount
of competition that is repressed, expressed as uncorrelated behavior 1− rz that is
repressed at a level a∗; this amount of reduced competition does not lower the long-
term value of the shared resource. In this simple model, competition has a cost only
through its affect on the value of the shared resource. So as mechanisms that repress
expression of competition rise, the competitive tendency of individuals also rises.
As I mentioned in Frank (1996c):
The high competitiveness in a policing situation is no different from high internal pressure
in a fish that lives at great depth. The fish brought to the surface explodes; intense compe-
tition and avoidance of repressive policing cause chaos when the same amount of energy is
devoted to competition in the absence of repressive policing.
We might add an additional direct cost of competitiveness, as in Frank (1996c), but
I do not include that here.
With regard to repression of competition, self interested individuals are favored
to invest in policing the group at a level
a∗ =
ra(1− rz)− crz
cra(1− rz) =
1
c
− rz
ra(1− rz) , (12)
with the constraint that 0 ≤ a∗ ≤ 1. The investment in policing to enforce group
cohesion: declines with cost of effective repression, c; declines with the intrinsic
correlation in competitive behavior, rz, because increased competitive correlation
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reduces the ability of one individual to outcompete another and thus favors individ-
uals to reduce their competitive tendencies without repression; and rises with the in-
trinsic correlation in investment in policing, ra, because greater correlation reduces
the loss an individual pays relative to neighbors for contribution to policing.
This simple model captures well how two opposing behaviors together shape the
nature of group cohesion. On the one hand, individual competition within groups in-
evitably leads to the tragedy of the commons unless check by some opposing force.
Intrinsic correlation in the competitive tendency between group members, rz, can
alleviate the tragedy, because correlated group members cannot outcompete their
neighbors and so gain by lowering their competitive tendencies. On the other hand,
if the intrinsic correlation in competitive behavior is low, then selfish individuals are
often favored to contribute to their own good by preventing the local devastation of
their shared resource. They may accomplish this by investing in mechanisms that
repress local competition, such as aspects of policing behavior.
The two distinct behaviors—individual competitiveness and contribution to group
mechanisms that suppress competition—lead to an interesting duality in individual
behavior. The most competitive groups, with low intrinsic correlation, rz, between
group members, most strongly favor competitive individuals to contribute resources
to the group good through investment in the policing mechanisms. Increased polic-
ing favors individuals to become even more competitive, because competition is
often suppressed as fewer shared resources become available for open competition.
So behavioral dynamics tend to favor both greater contribution to policing mecha-
nisms that promote the global good by preserving the shared resource and greater
competitiveness of individuals. Ultimately, the outcome depends on, c, how costly
it is to develop an effective mechanism to repress competition, and on the intrinsic
correlations in behavior that tie the success of individuals to other members of the
group.
We may think of repression of competition as a mechanism that enhances local
correlation. In a group that invests a∗ to suppress competition, the effective corre-
lation in competitive behavior between group members becomes a∗+(1−a∗)rz. In
words, a fraction a∗ of local resources is distributed fairly and without disruptive
competition that degrades the common resource, and a fraction 1− a∗ of local re-
sources remains available for local and destructive competition. Among that open
fraction, 1−a∗, the intrinsic correlation rz comes into play, leading to overall corre-
lation in competitive success against neighbors as express by a∗+(1−a∗)rz.
In the models here, I have assumed that each group member begins with the
same amount of resources. Interestingly, if individuals vary in their available re-
sources, even by small amounts, behavior tends to diverge between individuals
(Frank, 1996c). The relatively stronger individuals allocate much of their excess
resources in policing mechanisms that promote the global good, whereas relatively
weak individuals allocate nothing to policing mechanisms that preserve shared re-
sources. Put another way, small variations in individual resources cause the well
endowed to take over social control.
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3.3 Correlated Interests
The previous sections focused on correlated behaviors. Such correlation plays a
particularly important role when the individuals under study take actions and also
receive the consequences of similar actions by others. Typical games, the tragedy of
the commons, and mutual coercion fall into this class in which individuals are both
actors and recipients.
In many behavioral situations, an individual acts to affect a recipient, but the
recipient does not take any action. For example, an individual may provide aid to a
brother or offspring without reciprocation. Theories based on correlated behaviors
do not apply in these sorts of one-sided interactions. So, how may we account for
altruistic behaviors in these cases?
Presumably, an actor who makes a costly behavior in favor of a recipient must
value the recipient’s interests. In biology, we have an extensive theory by which
we can calculate how much an actor values different recipients (Frank, 1998). In
this case, individuals do not consciously put different values on different recipients.
Instead, natural selection shapes the behaviors of actors in relation to different re-
cipients. Outside of a biological framework, no theory provides an absolute basis
for assigning relative values. Because I focus in this section on general forms of the
theory that transcend biology, I limit my discussion here to how we may describe
relative valuation between actors and recipients, without regard to what causes such
valuations.
Suppose that, in valuing the total payoff to an individual in return for some be-
havior, z, we consider the individual’s relative regard for others and self as
W (z) = vWo(z)+Ws(z), (13)
where Wo is the valuation of others affected by an actor’s behavior, Ws is the val-
uation to self as a consequence of an actor’s behavior, and v is an exchange rate
between self valuation and valuation of others in a particular behavioral situation.
The change in an actor’s total valuation in return for a small change in behavior can
be written as dW/dz, and, using primes to denote differentiation with respect to z,
we may write the condition for an increase in the particular behavior to be favored
as
W ′ = vW ′o+W
′
s > 0. (14)
It is often useful to write this condition equivalently as
vBm−Cm > 0, (15)
where Bm is the marginal benefit to the recipient, and Cm is the marginal cost to the
actor. The behavior is favored when the value-weighted marginal benefits to others
are greater than the marginal costs to self. We could apply this method of valuation
to any sort of game or economic analysis of self interest.
In biology, the condition in Equation (15) for a behavior to be favored by natu-
ral selection is known as Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1970). The identical form of
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Equation (5) misleads (Frank, 1998, 2006). In Equation (5), r measures the effect of
behavioral correlation between neighbors on the direct success of the actor. The cor-
relation may arise by genetic similarity, but other processes that impose correlation
work in the same way. By contrast, v in Equation (15) measures an actor’s regard
for the success of a recipient of the behavior—often, the recipient does not express
any behavior in return and has no direct affect on the actor. Biology values v by the
genetic similarity of the actor to the recipient.
3.4 Synergism and the Origin of Mutually Beneficial Behaviors
Different groups with complementary skills or resources can achieve synergistic
gains by cooperating. However, if few tend to join cooperative ventures, then an in-
dividual who puts forward its potentially complementary resource may end up los-
ing that resource. By contrast, if everyone tends to join synergistic activities, then
no one gains by withholding their complementary skill, and cooperation is easily
maintained. In this case, the difficulty concerns how to start synergistic partnerships
which, once they become common, are easily maintained by advantages to self in-
terested individuals (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981).
Much of the cooperative structure of life in biology and in human behavior arises
from such synergistic interactions. The positive feedbacks and consistency of coop-
eration often become so deeply embedded that their very existence can be difficult
to discern. The more cooperative and nonvarying the interaction, the less one tends
to notice it.
For example, many animals depend on the numerous bacteria that they carry in
their bodies: the bacteria provide essential dietary products to the host. The bacte-
ria, in turn, sometimes cannot live without their hosts. This modern synergism is
easy to understand: mutual dependence and mutual gain, although the potential for
conflict remains within the alliance. In humans, specialized production and trade en-
genders mutual dependence and enhanced alliance; subsequent conflict runs within
the constraints of synergistic benefits.
How do transitions occur between an initially uncooperative situation and a fi-
nal situation in which cooperation reigns? Often, in the initially uncooperative state,
no one gains by offering their special skills or resources if the behavioral or struc-
tural situation does not return synergistically matching skills or resources. So, the
difficulty is how to get things started.
The transition from an initially uncooperative state to a cooperative one often
turns on the behavioral correlation between potential partners (Axelrod and Hamil-
ton, 1981). For example, if cooperation is rare, but the behavioral correlation is high,
then those rare individuals who tend to cooperate will often meet cooperative part-
ners, and so mutually beneficial synergism can get started. As before, the cause of
such correlation does not matter: cooperative individuals may be able to recognize
each other and seek each other, or the few cooperative individuals may for accidental
reasons tend to live near each other.
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A simple game captures the way in which behavioral correlations influence tran-
sitions from uncooperative beginnings to synergistically cooperative and mutually
beneficial social structures (Frank, 1998). Consider, for example, a particular inter-
action between an individual from group I and an individual from group II.
Fig. 1 Matrix for a two-
player game. The cells show
the payoff to player I given
strategies by two players
in an encounter. The C and
D strategies correspond to
cooperation and defection.
The payoff to player II in
this symmetric game can be
obtained by transposing the
matrix. I assume a> 1.
C          a            0
D          1            1
II
I
C D
The game matrix in Figure 1 shows the payoffs for three different outcomes.
First, an individual keeps the initial resource if it does not enter a joint venture
with a potential partner. In the figure, withholding cooperative behavior is the D or
defect strategy. A defector keeps the initial resource, in this case equal to a payoff
of one unit, no matter what the partner does. Second, if an individual puts forward
its resource in the C or cooperative strategy, and the partner does not reciprocate,
then the individual loses its resource and receives a payoff of zero. Third, if both
cooperate, then both gain the synergistic benefits with a payoff of a> 1.
In a particular encounter, player I cooperates with probability p, and player II
cooperates with probability q (mixed strategies allowed). The payoff to player I is
w(p,q) = 1+ p(aq−1), (16)
and the payoff to player II is w(q, p) by the symmetry of the payoff structure. Here,
the players are drawn from separate populations, with average strategies p and q,
respectively.
From Equation (16), we can see that player I is favored to increase its level of
cooperation, p, when, on average,
q> 1/a. (17)
To understand this condition, we must consider what information player I has about
the expected behavior, q, of its partner, player II.
Player I has information about player II’s strategy to the extent that interacting
pairs have correlated behaviors. Suppose p deviates from its population average by
δ = p− p. Then we can describe the information player I has about the expected
behavioral deviation of its partner by a regression equation
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E(q|p)−q= rδ , (18)
where r is a regression coefficient, because the players are drawn from different
populations (Frank, 1994a). Given this regression equation, we can express the ex-
pected value of player II’s behavior given information about player I’s behavior as
q+ rδ , and so the condition in Equation (17) for player I to be favored to increase
its cooperative behavior becomes
q+ rδ > 1/a. (19)
If we start with the absence of cooperation, p = q = 0, then full cooperation can
spread only when
r > 1/a. (20)
Thus, a significant behavioral correlation is needed to make the transition to a coop-
erative state. Once the populations have moved to full cooperation, they gain from
synergistic benefits because a > 1. At that point, no correlation is needed to main-
tain cooperation. Thus, correlation drives the initial transition, but does not play a
role in subsequent maintenance.
With full cooperation, each population may become dependent on the skills and
resources of its partner population. At that point, mutual dependence causes coop-
eration to become essentially irreversible (Frank, 1995b). Much of cooperation and
the evolution of social structure may follow such a path, through which brief peri-
ods of information about social partners allow mutually beneficial traits to flourish.
As those traits flourish, they become embedded in the structure of opportunities
available and payoffs gained. Such traits of mutual dependence may come to seem
more as fixed aspects of the social environment than as interesting characteristics
reflecting the social tension between cooperation and conflict.
4 Biological History
Some people may believe that biological history can teach us little about our own
species’ conflicts, cooperative associations, and moral dilemmas. But, upon study,
one has to be surprised by how often the basic forces of social tension in human life
have deeply and inexorably shaped biological history. The lessons drawn from such
similarity are, certainly, points of debate. But before we can consider the debate, we
need some facts to set a common ground for discussion.
I organize biological aspects of cooperation along the lines of the four major
forces that shape the nature of conflict and cooperation among self interested indi-
viduals. Those forces are correlation between social partners, repression of competi-
tion, correlated interests between actor and recipient, and synergism. In this section,
I consider the role played by each of those forces in the history of life. The broad
topic is, of course, too great to cover fully. So I use a few examples to illustrate the
key points.
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4.1 Correlated Behavior and the Tragedy of the Commons
The tragedy of the commons arises because self interested individuals gain by com-
peting against neighbors. Rapacious individuals outcompete their neighbors and
gain a larger share of the local resource. But rapacious behavior depletes the lo-
cal resource in a way that reduces the long-term yield, causing harm to all mem-
bers of the group. A mechanism that causes correlation in behavior between group
members favors prudent behavior, greater sustainable productivity, and benefit to all
group members.
I applied the tragedy of the commons to problems in biology (Frank, 1995a,
1996b), extending a long history of work on group selection (Hamilton, 1967, 1972,
1975; Lewontin, 1970; Leigh, 1977, 1991; Wilson, 1980; Colwell and Wilson, 1981;
Szathma´ry and Demeter, 1987). My work arose from study of biological problems
such as the sex ratio of progeny produced by mothers within small isolated groups
and the amount of harm a parasite causes to its host. I discuss how these applications
and related problems have grown into a major field of study in evolutionary biology
(Rankin et al., 2007).
4.1.1 Sex Ratio: the Production of Males as a Competitive Trait
In almost all animals, females produce babies and males do little except compete,
mate, and provide sperm. With regard to reproduction, females are productive and
males are competitive. In some animals, males contribute more that just matings,
and the situation is more complex. But the vast majority animals follow the sim-
ple dichotomy. For example, one can think of most male insects as the mother’s
competitive winged sperm.
Consider the male-female distinction from a mother’s point of view. She can
make a daughter, who produces babies. Or she can make a son, who competes with
other males for matings but produces nothing directly.
A mother’s investment in sons is an investment in a trait to compete against other
mothers in the local mating group (Hamilton, 1967). The more a mother invests in
sons, the more grandchildren she will have through her sons. Those extra grand-
children come at the expense of reduced numbers of grandchildren through sons by
other mothers in the group, because the total number of grandchildren is fixed by
the number of productive daughters that are made.
This problem of allocation of resources to competitive sons is formally equiva-
lent to the tragedy of the commons problem that I introduced earlier in Equation (6)
(Frank, 2006). In particular, suppose a mother allocates a fraction I of her reproduc-
tive resources to sons and a fraction 1−I to daughters. Assume that, in a local group,
daughters and sons grow up and mate with each other, and then the mated daughters
disperse to find new reproductive opportunities—a pattern of mating and dispersal
that occurs in many insects (Hamilton, 1967). In a local group, suppose that, on
average, mothers allocate G of their resources to sons and 1−G to daughters.
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A mother’s payoff is the combination of her success through her sons, Ws, and
her success through her daughters, Wd , yielding total success as W =Ws+Wd . For
sons, the payoff follows exactly the tragedy of the commons expression for payoff
in Equation (6) as
Ws =
I
G
(1−G). (21)
The first term, I/G, accounts for the relative success of a mother through the mat-
ings obtained by her sons. For example, a mother may make K babies of which a
fraction I are sons, giving her KI sons. In the group, there are N mothers who, on
average, each make KG sons. So the fraction of all males in the group by the fo-
cal mother is I/(NG). Those males compete for matings among the local resource,
the KN(1−G) daughters produced by all mothers in the local group. Combining
the terms and dropping K as an arbitrary proportionality constant gives Ws. Success
through daughters is the number of daughters produced by a mother, K(1− I), and
again we drop K as a proportionality constant. Combining success through sons and
daughters yields total payoff as (Hamilton, 1967)
W =
I
G
(1−G)+1− I. (22)
We apply the same methods used to obtain Equation (8). The solution is z∗ =
(1− r)/2, where z∗ is the fraction of resources a mother allocates to sons such that,
if nearly everyone adopts this behavior, no behavior that deviates from it can obtain
a higher payoff, and r is the correlation in the sex ratio produced by mothers within
a local group (Frank, 1985, 1998).
The solution parses more easily when we write the best allocation to sons and
daughters as a ratio 1− r : 1+ r. Here, the term 1− r for male allocation arises from
the equivalence between male allocation and the tragedy of the commons (Frank,
2006). Sons are the direct expression of a mother’s competition against neighboring
mothers. Sons are made at the expense of daughters. Daughters contribute to the
success of all mothers in the group by providing mates for those mothers’ sons.
The term 1 + r for the relative value of female allocation arises as follows.
Each extra daughter made by a mother contributes to the mother’s success directly
through the grandchildren produced by the daughter—the valuation of one. In addi-
tion, an extra daughter provides an extra mate to males in the local group. That extra
mate for sons accrues to the strategy pursued by the focal mother in proportion to
the correlation between the mother’s strategy (her sex ratio) and the average strategy
in the local group (Frank, 1998).
This sex ratio model makes a simple qualitative prediction. As the correlation be-
tween mothers declines, mothers compete more intensely with each other by raising
their relative allocation to sons. If we assume that behavioral correlation in a small
group arises mainly from a mother’s correlation to herself, then in the simplest case
r= 1/N, where N is the number of mothers in the local group. This gives us Hamil-
ton’s (1967) famous model of the sex ratio under local competition for mates. With
this expression, r declines as the number of mothers in the group, N, rises. So the
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prediction becomes: as N rises, the fraction of males produces by mothers should
rise.
Many studies show that as more mothers contribute to a local group, the com-
petitive allocation to sons rises (Godfray and Werren, 1996; Hardy, 2002). My own
study on fig wasps provides a simple and direct demonstration (Frank, 1985, see
also Herre 1985). In the species I studied, a mated fig wasp female gets inside a fig,
lays her eggs, and dies. More than one mated female may lay her eggs within a fig
during a short window of a few days. About four weeks later, the male offspring
emerge first within the dark cavity in the center of the fig. The males mate with the
quiescent females. After a few days, one of the males chews a tunnel through the
wall of the fig, stimulating the mated females to emerge, exit, and find another fig
to start the cycle anew.
Fig biology imposes exactly the life course assumed by the sex ratio model of
local mating and competition among males (Hamilton, 1979). To test the theory, I
manipulated the number of mothers that enter each fig. Do these tiny mothers, each
less than 2mm, detect the number of other mothers in the dark fig cavity and adjust
their allocation to competitive sons? Figure 2 shows that they do.
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Fig. 2 Sex ratio of fig wasps. Foundresses per fig represents the number of mothers laying eggs
in each fig. The numbers of foundresses were controlled experimentally. Each “X” marks the sex
ratio of all foundresses in a single fig. The percent males rises with the number of foundresses,
matching the tragedy of the commons prediction that mothers increase their competitive allocation
to sons in response to an increase in the number of other mothers that compete in the local group.
Redrawn from Frank (1985).
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4.1.2 Parasite Virulence: A General Model for Prudent versus Rapacious
Exploitation of Resources
Some parasites exploit their hosts in a prudent way, taking the resources that they
need without causing noticeable damage. Prudent exploitation yields sustainable
benefits to the parasite as long as the host remains healthy. Other parasites attack
their host more quickly and vigorously. Rapid exploitation may allow the parasites
to achieve higher reproductive rates, but damage to the host reduces the parasites’
opportunity for sustainable yield (Frank, 1996b).
Following this economic line of thought, each parasite faces a tradeoff when
increasing the rate at which host resources are used. Greater exploitation has the
benefit of more rapid reproduction and transmission to new hosts, but carries the
cost of reducing the host’s ability to procure more resources in the future. For each
host-parasite interaction, there may be a particular optimum schedule of host uti-
lization that maximizes the parasites’ balance between rapid transmission and the
time before the host dies (Fenner et al., 1956; Levin and Pimental, 1981; Anderson
and May, 1982; Levin, 1983).
One process missing from the tradeoff between transmission and virulence con-
cerns the “social” aspect of parasite interactions. Suppose that prudent exploitation
of a host maximizes a parasite’s reproduction. Natural selection then favors each
parasite, when alone in a host, to follow the prudent strategy. There is, however, a
problem when two or more parasites with different strategies occupy the same host.
If one strategy extracts host resources rapidly and reproduces quickly, then the host
may die in a short time. A prudent strategy would have relatively low reproduction
when paired in a host with a rapacious strategy because, for both strategies, the host
is short-lived, and the rapacious strategy reproduces more rapidly than the prudent
one. This is the tragedy of the commons.
Correlation in behavior between members of a group mitigates the tragedy of the
commons. In biology, the correlation typically arises by genetic relatedness within a
group. In the case of parasite virulence, the prediction is that more related parasites
within a host will behave more prudently, competing less intensely among them-
selves and causing less harm to the host (Hamilton, 1972; Bremermann and Pick-
ering, 1983; Frank, 1992, 1996b). Figure 3 supports the predicted trend: reduced
correlation among parasites increases the damage caused to the host.
The pattern in Figure 3 leaves open the issue of whether competition between
unrelated parasite lineages plays a direct role in causing harm to the host. de Roode
et al. (2005) showed that, in the parasite that causes malaria, the more competi-
tive parasite lineages did outcompete other parasites within the host and did cause
greater harm to the host. This study of the malaria parasite ties the direct competi-
tion over local resources to the harm caused to the public good—the health of the
host that provides resources to the parasites.
The problem of parasite virulence captures well the essence of many biolog-
ical examples of the tragedy of the commons (Frank, 1996b). For example, the
most primitive cells probably contained several molecules that could make copies
of themselves—the primitive genes. Each trait of those replicating molecules was
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Fig. 3 Virulence of nematodes infecting fig wasps. The fig wasps I described in the sex ratio section
often carry parasitic nematodes. Herre (1993) studied how much harm these parasitic nematodes
cause to their hosts. He predicted that greater mixing between nematode lineages would reduce the
correlation of behavior (relatedness) within hosts and lead to greater virulence. The data support the
prediction. Here, multi-foundress broods measure the fraction of figs in which more than one wasp
entered. The more often multiple foundresses enter a fig, the more often the nematode lineages
will likely mix, reducing within-host correlation. Herre measured virulence by 1− fi/ fu, where fi
and fu are the number of babies produced by infected and uninfected wasps, respectively. Lower
productivity of infected wasps corresponds to higher virulence. Redrawn from Herre (1993).
selected according to the balance between individual benefit from rapid exploitation
of local resources and group benefit from prudent exploitation of local resources.
In other words, the problem of cooperation versus conflict in groups arose in the
earliest stages of biological history.
4.1.3 Scale of Competition and the Role of Group Productivity
I presented a simple tragedy of the commons model in Equation (6). In that model,
individuals can potentially gain by restraining competition in order to enhance the
productivity of their group. Individuals in more productive groups benefit by getting
a piece of a greater local resource, even if their piece may be smaller than their
neighbors’.
This simple model for the tragedy of the commons makes implicit assumptions
about how individuals compete and how we measure success. In evolutionary mod-
els, we generally measure the success of an individual relative to some base pop-
ulation, because we are interested in whether a behavior is gaining or losing in
frequency in response to its success relative to other behaviors in the comparison
population.
Suppose we regard the local group as part of a broader population, and we mea-
sure the success of each individual relative to the broader population. Then a coop-
erative individual can gain in the population by trading a smaller share of the local
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resource in return for a greater total value of the local resource. In other words, a
prudent group gains greater total productivity, benefiting all members of the group.
The interpretation of differential group productivity benefiting members of prudent
groups matches the tragedy of the commons model that I gave earlier. In this case,
an individual’s success is measured relative to the broad population composed of
many local groups.
But what if an individual’s success is measured relative only to other members
of its local group? For example, if there is no competition between members of dif-
ferent groups, then each individual’s relative success arises only from its advantage
or disadvantage compared to its neighbors in its local group (Wilson et al., 1992;
Taylor, 1992a,b; Queller, 1994).
We can, in general, define the problem by the scale of competition (Frank, 1998).
Let the scale of competition, s, be the probability that an individual ultimately com-
petes against and measures its relative success against only local group members,
and 1− s be the probability that an individual ultimately competes against and mea-
sures its success against members of the broader population. The base population
for measuring success determines how a particular level of success translates into
change in the frequency of a behavioral strategy.
With this definition for the scale of competition, we can extend the tragedy of the
commons model in Equation (6) to
W =
I
G
(
1−G
s(1−G)+(1− s)(1− z∗)
)
, (23)
where z∗ is the average level of competitive behavior in the population, I = z∗+
δ is the deviation from the average by a randomly chosen focal individual, and
G = z∗+ rδ is the deviation of the group average by the focal individual’s local
group. By following the approach given earlier, we can find the value of z∗ that, once
adopted by the population, cannot be beat. Because z∗, the level of competitiveness
of individuals, varies in this model between zero and one, we can write 1− z∗ for
the level of individual cooperation, yielding
1− z∗ = r
( 1− s
1− rs
)
, (24)
where r is the correlation in behavior within local groups. Increased behavioral cor-
relation, r, favors cooperation. By contrast, increased local competition, s, reduces
cooperation. An individual cannot gain by providing benefit to a neighbor if the
individual’s ultimate success is measured only against neighbors. Cooperation can
increase only to the extent that an individual ultimately competes against and mea-
sures success against members of other groups.
Griffin et al. (2004) studied how behavioral correlation and the scale of compe-
tition jointly determine cooperative behavior in bacteria. Pathogenic bacteria often
face iron limitation when living within a host; hosts often withhold iron as a defense
against bacteria. Some bacteria can secrete a molecule—a siderophore—that scav-
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enges iron from the host. The bacteria then take up siderophore-iron complexes to
overcome their deficiency.
Siderophore production is a public good: costly for individuals to produce and
equally beneficial for all members of the local group. In particular, any member
of the local group can take up a siderophore-iron complex independently of who
originally secreted the siderophore.
Griffin et al. experimentally varied behavioral correlation by changing the amount
of mixing between different bacterial clones. Relatively pure clones cause high be-
havioral correlation through genetic similarity. Mixed clones have lower behavioral
correlation because of greater genetic diversity. They varied the scale of competition
by altering the constraint placed on the contribution of local groups to the following
generation. If all groups contribute equally by constraint, then individuals compete
only locally within their group, and the scale of competition is entirely local. If
groups contribute in proportion to their productivity, then individuals compete fully
with members of other groups, and the scale of competition is global.
Fig. 4 Evolutionary change in siderophore production. Time moves from left to right, each unit
representing one day and one round of mixing of the bacteria to impose either local or global com-
petition. The behavioral correlation, r, was controlled by the degree of mixing between different
bacterial clones. From Figure 3 of Griffin et al. (2004).
The experiment set the conditions that determine behavioral correlation and the
scale of competition. Then, over time, the evolutionary change in populations was
followed with regard to siderophore production, which measures production of a
public good and the degree of local cooperation. Figure 4 shows that the experiment
supports the predictions of Equation (24): greater behavioral correlation and global
competition increase cooperation.
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4.2 Repression of Competition
Correlated behaviors align interests and favor reduced competition. But highly co-
operative behavior often occurs in nature with little correlation in the intrinsic ten-
dency of individuals. To achieve that high level of cooperation in the absence of
intrinsic correlation, there must be some force extrinsic to each individual that tends
to align interests and behaviors (Frank, 2003).
Reduced opportunity for competition can align interests. If an individual cannot
compete against neighbors, then that individual can increase its own success only
by enhancing the efficiency and productivity of its group (Leigh, 1977; Alexander,
1979).
In the first example, a randomization process assigns success to individuals inde-
pendently of their behavior within the local group, preventing any individual from
gaining by competing against neighbors. In the second example, powerful individ-
uals within the local group repress competition between lower ranking individuals;
such policing of competition appears to play a key role in social integration within
the group. In the final example, one species domesticates and essentially enslaves
another species. The master species gains by preventing competition between en-
slaved members of the group, in order to prevent wasted energy devoted to internal
competition.
4.2.1 Randomization and Fairness
Sexual reproduction mixes the genes from two parents to make an offspring. Each
parent contributes one half of the genes. Meiosis is the process by which each parent
selects one half of its own genes for transmission to the child. Biologists often refer
to the process as “fair meiosis,” to emphasize that each copy of a gene has an equal
chance of being chosen. This randomization process means that no gene copy can
gain an advantage over other gene copies in being transmitted to the offspring.
With no opportunity for local competition, all gene copies gain only with the
enhanced success of the whole group (Leigh, 1971). In this case, we call the group
of the genes the “genome.” The unity of the genome, and thus the unity of the
individual, is so nearly complete that one often thinks of the genome in a unitary way
rather than as a collection of cooperating genes (Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry,
1995). However, competition between gene copies does occur in nature, in which
one gene copy increases its chance of getting transmitted to the offspring at the
expense of other gene copies (Crow, 1979).
Competition between gene copies reminds one that the reproductive fairness and
the near unity of the genome evolved in the face of competitive pressure between
neighbors. The puzzle concerns how the process of natural selection, acting on the
interests of the individual gene copies, led to particular biochemical mechanisms
that typically repress internal competition (Frank, 1995a), and how those mecha-
nisms can sometimes be subverted by certain competitive types.
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This example shows that the very foundations of sex, reproduction, and the ge-
netic transmission of information arose from the group cohesion of a collection of
genes. That cohesion was created by processes that repress internal competition and
bind the interests of the separate genes to the group (Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry,
1995).
As I mentioned, the cohesion of the genome often appears so complete that we
use the word “individual” to refer to a single genome—a single collection of genes
in an organism. But that “individual” is a constructed group, cohesive only because
of the high reliability of the internal mechanisms that ensure reproductive fairness
among gene copies.
The occasional gene copies that subvert these fairness mechanisms and outcom-
pete neighbors emphasize that unity in biology must always be constructed and
maintained. Such unity arises solely from self interested actors. The system of co-
hesion built by those self interested actors must enforce against the competitive
tendencies of those same actors. And so it always goes: conflict and cooperation in
constant tension and never separable.
4.2.2 Policing and Repression of Competition
Individuals in a group may prevent others from competing. Such repression of com-
petition by third-party policing reduces opportunity for individuals to gain at the
expense of their neighbors. Once again, in the absence of opportunity to outcom-
pete a neighbor, an individual can increase its own success only by enhancing group
efficiency and productivity.
Policing of competition can be a very effective mechanism to promote group
cohesion. However, policing competition between others can be dangerous or costly.
Why should a self interested actor take on the costs of the policing role? In Section
3.2, I showed the conditions under which an individual may gain more by its benefit
from living in a more productive group than it loses by the costs of policing. I also
mentioned how the theory predicts an interesting asymmetry with regard to policing:
those individuals with relatively greater vigor or resources are favored to take on the
policing role, whereas those with relatively lower vigor or resources do not gain
from policing (Frank, 1996c). Thus, the theory predicts that the relatively powerful
individuals impose social control on the group when effective mechanisms exist for
dominant individuals to repress competition and promote group cohesion.
Flack et al. (2005a,b) studied policing and group cohesion in pigtailed macaques.
Dominant males intervene to control disputes between pairs of lower ranking indi-
viduals. Those policing acts usually do not favor one competitor over the other, but
rather the intervention puts an end to the conflict.
Flack et al. (2005a,b) analyzed the consequences of policing interventions for
various aspects of group cohesion. They compared two situations in a semi-natural
captive colony. In the baseline case, the dominant males were present and acted in
their normal way to settle disputes. In the “knockout” experiment, Flack et al. re-
moved the dominant males and placed them just outside a wall that bounded the
24 S. A. Frank
colony. The dominant males were visible to the colony members but could not in-
tervene.
When policing males were removed, the amount of aggressive behavior in the
colony increased. Measures of aggression included initiation of conflicts, intensity
of conflicts, biting, and joining a conflict. With the rise in conflict, there was also
a decline in affiliative behaviors: reconciliation, play, grooming, and physical prox-
imity. From these observations, Flack et al. (2005a) concluded:
The extent to which policing is important to organizational robustness is surprising con-
sidering that actual policing behavior occurs relatively rarely. This suggests that the simple
presence of individuals responsible for conflict management can change the way group
members are willing to interact with one another.
In my own work (Frank, 1996c), I developed the theoretical prediction with re-
gard to policing when individuals vary in vigor or resources:
Small variations in individual vigour or resources can lead to large variations in individual
contributions to policing the group. Stronger individuals often invest all of their excess
resources into policing, but weaker individuals do not contribute to group cohesion.
Flack et al. (2005b) directly addressed this prediction:
The primary finding of this study is that heterogeneities in power, by producing hetero-
geneities in the cost of conflict management for individuals, lead to heterogeneities in the
tendency to police.
In pigtailed macaques, the well endowed make essentially all the investment in so-
cial control.
In a subsequent paper, Flack et al. (2006) concluded that policing by dominant
individuals plays a key role in group cohesion:
We observe that when policing is operational, group members build larger social networks
characterized by greater partner diversity and increased potential for socially positive conta-
gion and cooperation. Without policing, high conflict frequency and severity leads to more
conservative social interactions and a less integrated society.
4.2.3 Domestication and Repression of Competition
Humans have domesticated various animal and plant species for food production.
Ants began farming much earlier—about 50 million years ago (Mueller, 2002).
Fungus growing ants collect plant material to feed their crops. The ants weed
their gardens to protect against fungal parasites that specialize in attacking fungus
gardens. The ants also grow specialized cultures of bacteria on their bodies in order
to use the antibiotic secretions produced by their partner bacteria (Zhang et al.,
2007). The antibiotics protect the fungal gardens from bacterial diseases.
Domesticated fungal species were once wild, free living species. New domes-
ticates carry with them their own evolved tendencies for competition in local
groups—their tragedy of the commons—in which such competition reduces the ef-
ficiency and productivity of the domesticates.
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I developed the general prediction that nonhuman masters gain by repressing
competition among domesticates in order to elicit the most efficient domestic pro-
ductivity (Frank, 1996a). In natural, unregulated situations, mixture between ge-
netically unrelated strains often leads to greater competition between individuals
and a decline in productivity. Such competition develops between mixed lineages
because mixture reduces the behavioral correlation between individuals. Following
this logic, the easiest way for ant farmers to reduce conflict between fungal domesti-
cates would be to prevent mixing of fungal lineages in their gardens. Homogeneous
domesticates have high correlation in their cooperative tendencies, leading to an
intrinsic tendency to reduce competition and enhance group productivity.
Ants do in fact prevent mixing of domesticate fungal lineages (Bot et al., 2001;
Mueller et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2007). When a newborn queen leaves her birth-
place to found a new colony, she brings with her the fungal lineage from her natal
colony. The fungi produce chemicals that inhibit growth by competing lineages;
the ants spread those anti-competitor chemicals in their feces, which fertilize the
growing fungal garden.
4.3 Correlated Interests
An individual may value payoff to another individual. Such other regarding behavior
arises commonly in biology from genetic relatedness. For example, life depends on
the regard a parent has for its offspring.
In biology, we can tally the payoff to a parent for its various behaviors directed at
offspring. We first count the benefits of those behaviors for the offspring discounted
by the genetic correlation between parent and offspring. We then subtract off the
direct cost of the behaviors for the parent. This calculation yields Hamilton’s rule,
by which a behavior is favored when rb− c > 0, where r is the genetic correlation
(or regression) between actor and recipient, b is the benefit to the recipient, and c is
the cost to the actor—see Equation (15).
The actor’s valuation of the recipient in proportion to genetic correlation arises
from the fact that transmission of strategies through time ultimately determines the
evolutionary dynamics of behavior. A recipient of a behavior carries the actor’s de-
viation from the average strategy in proportion to the genetic correlation between
actor and recipient.
Other forces may sometimes affect the valuation of a recipient by the actor. For
example, the recipient may return a beneficial behavior at a later time (Trivers,
1971). In this case, valuation of another arises as an investment in an expected fu-
ture payback. Most often, however, other regarding behavior in biology arises from
genetic relatedness.
Parental altruism toward offspring occurs so widely in nature that I will not elab-
orate further on that case. Instead, I focus on two interesting examples in which
individuals weigh their comparative regard for different classes of genetic relatives.
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The comparative aspect highlights the quantitative nature by which an actor regards
the payoff to others.
4.3.1 Competition for being the Queen
In many social insect colonies, a newborn female may develop into a reproductive
queen or a partially sterile worker (Wilson, 1971). A queen directly produces off-
spring; a worker helps to raise sisters and brothers. A newborn female often would
gain more by developing into a queen rather than a worker. Here, I measure success
by the biological standard of genetic contribution to future generations. I tabulate
total genetic success by the effect of a behavior on direct reproduction and on the
reproduction of genetic relatives weighted by the genetic relatedness of actor to re-
cipient.
The queen or the older workers usually control the fate of newborn females—
development into either the queen or worker caste. The elders control the caste of
newborns by manipulating offspring size, by varying chemical stimulus, and by al-
tering the provisioning of food. The elders’ control over caste represses competition
between newborns over development into queens.
In a particular type of social bee, elders do not coerce the caste of newborns
(Wenseleers and Ratnieks, 2004). Each newborn female may develop unconstrained
into either a queen or a worker. However, the number of available opportunities for
newborn queens to lead a colony is limited. Those who develop into queens compete
with each other for those limited slots. Only a small number of queens succeed in
this competition; the losers die and do not contribute to the colony productivity.
The competition between newborn queens causes a tragedy of the commons
(Wenseleers and Ratnieks, 2004). To increase group efficiency and productivity, the
colony should avoid costly overproduction of queens, most of whom die in com-
petition with their neighbors. Those queens who die in competition could have de-
veloped into workers who contribute to common productivity. However, individuals
may gain by competing for the extra individual payoff of being a queen.
The calculation of payoffs for being a worker or queen is more complex in this
case than for the simple tragedy of the commons models I discussed earlier. In this
case, we must account for other regarding valuations ascribed to different kinds of
genetic relatives. In particular, we want to know how the behavioral choice of being
a queen or a worker affects others in the colony, and how the actor, faced with the
choice of alternative development, regards those who are affected by the choice.
A special aspect of bees, ants, and wasps arises from their asymmetric inheritance
system. A mother’s unfertilized egg develops into a son; her fertilized egg develops
into a daughter. Queens mate with males and produce both unfertilized sons and
fertilized daughters. Workers do not mate, but can lay unfertilized sons.
Workers will typically be offspring of the queen. The workers help to rear the
new eggs laid in the colony. Most of those new eggs will be laid by the queen and
will be the workers’ sisters and brothers. However, some of the workers will directly
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lay their own sons. Thus, in rearing new eggs, a worker will also be helping to rear
some of her sisters’ sons—that is, her nephews.
Here is a central point: a female is more closely related to her nephew than to her
brother because of the peculiar asymmetry in inheritance (Hamilton, 1972). So the
ratio of nephews to brothers determines the valuation a worker gains from her effort
to rear the eggs produced by the colony. The more nephews produced directly by
her sister-workers, the more a female values the eggs she helps to rear as a worker.
Now we return to the key behavioral choice. A newborn female can become a
queen and rear sons and daughters. Or she can become a worker and rear sisters,
brothers, and nephews. The greater the ratio of nephews to brothers, the greater the
valuation of being a worker via accounting for genetic regard for others.
Thus, we come to a simple prediction (Wenseleers and Ratnieks, 2004). The
fraction of females who develop into queens should decline as the amount of egg
laying by workers rises. To state the reasoning again: more egg laying by workers
means that a worker will raise an increased ratio of nephews to brothers. A worker
values a nephew more highly than a brother. As the fraction of nephews increases,
the relative value of being a worker rises, and the relative gain of competing for a
queenship drops compared to the expected gain of being a worker. Figure 5 shows
data that support the prediction. More egg laying by workers is associated with a
lower fraction of newborn females developing into queens.
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Fig. 5 Fraction of newborn females who develop into queens. More worker eggs laid means that a
worker rears a higher fraction of more valuable nephews compared with brothers. Theory predicts
that as the fraction of more valuable nephews increases, more newborn females will develop into
workers rather than queens, causing the percentage of queens produced to decline. Data from four
bee species of the genus Melipona support the prediction. The percentage of queens produced in
subnitida and quadrifasciata do not differ significantly, so those two species are lumped into a
single intermediate category. Redrawn from Wenseleers and Ratnieks (2004).
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4.3.2 Worker Valuation of Egg Production by Other Workers
I stated that, in the bees, ants, and wasps, a sister is more closely related to her
nephew than to her brother. This asymmetry occurs when a colony has a single
queen who mates with only one male, as in the particular bees discussed in the
previous example. However, in some other species, a queen may mate several times,
or there may be multiple queens. The number of queens, the number of times a
queen mates, and the level of inbreeding affect the asymmetry in relatedness of a
worker to nephews and brothers (Hamilton, 1972).
We can avoid complexity by considering a simple prediction. When a worker is
more related to the sons of other workers than to sons produced by the queen, she
will allow other workers to produce sons without interference. By contrast, when a
worker is more related to the queen’s sons than to sons produced by other workers,
she will interfere with reproduction by other workers (Wenseleers and Ratnieks,
2006).
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Fig. 6 Relatedness asymmetry determines whether a worker allows other workers to reproduce.
Negative values of the relatedness difference mean that a worker is more closely related to the
queen’s sons than to the workers’ sons. Positive values mean the opposite. The height of each
point shows the percentage of all males produced by a colony that derive from workers (scaled
logarithmically). The plot shows 90 different species of ants (circles), bees (squares), and wasps
(triangles). Redrawn from Wenseleers and Ratnieks (2006).
Figure 6 supports the prediction that relatedness asymmetry determines worker
behavior. When workers are more related to other workers’ sons than to the queen’s
sons, then the percentage of males produced by workers rises significantly above
zero. By contrast, when workers are more related to the queen’s sons than to other
workers’ sons, production of sons by workers is almost always very close to zero.
In this case, the workers prevent other workers from producing sons by eating the
eggs laid by workers.
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These two examples from social insects show that the biological theory of other
regarding valuation based on genetic kinship provides precise quantitative under-
standing of behavior.
4.4 Synergism and the Origin of Mutually Beneficial Behaviors
The prior examples concerned behaviors that can be directly observed: sex ratio,
parasite virulence, or tolerance of egg laying by sister-workers. By contrast, syner-
gism concerns the origin of mutually beneficial behaviors at some time in the past.
Mutually beneficial behaviors often require complementary specialization. Such
specialization frequently does not exist in advance of the cooperative venture
(Frank, 1995b). So the first problem concerns how the mutually beneficial behavior
got started and became sufficiently integrated to provide fully synergistic benefits.
As parties come to depend on each other’s complementary specializations, they
may over time become mutually dependent. If so, then a second problem concerns
the irreversibility of synergistic behavior: neither party can succeed without the part-
nership. Put another way, as each player becomes adjusted to the presence of the
other, the other takes on the role of an essential part of the environment without
which the individual cannot succeed. Indeed, the integration can become so com-
plete that it is hard to see the past history—in the present, the players have become
so completely interdependent that we tend to view them as a unit.
Much of the deep structure of life may have followed a path in which separate en-
tities interacted synergistically and became mutually dependent. Synergism may be
the most important of topics in the study of group integration, but it is also the most
difficult of topics to analyze. Past separation becomes hidden in present integration.
4.4.1 The Origin of Integrated Individuals
It is difficult to identify past synergism in current behaviors. So I will start with a
theoretical example. The example concerns how the earliest kind of life may have
become integrated into more complex cooperative groups.
Life depends on molecules that copy themselves. Those molecules that replicate
at the highest rate increase in abundance. If the error rate in replication is suffi-
ciently low, then a progeny molecule is mostly like its parent, and carries the same
information that provided a replicative edge to its parent (Eigen, 1971).
All of life became structured into cells early in history. A cell contains the infor-
mational molecules that copy themselves. Those informational molecules direct the
biochemical physiology of the cell. The physiology runs the program by which the
cell acquires resources, protects itself against perturbation, and copies its informa-
tional molecules.
A cell is a complex cooperative consortium of multiple informational molecules,
each informational component directing a part of the physiology needed to run the
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collaborative enterprise. Because cells require complex integration of components,
simple informational molecules that copy themselves must have preceded the earli-
est cells (Eigen and Schuster, 1979; Maynard Smith, 1979).
How can different kinds of self interested molecules come to be associated in a
mutually beneficial synergism?
It is easy enough to imagine that if two different types express complementary
information, then their interaction produces synergistic benefits. But how did the
two types come to express complementary information, if each initially evolved in
isolation? The problem turns on a threshold, as in the earlier theoretical section on
synergism (Frank, 1995b). If both populations of alternative molecules express, on
average, a level of complementary information above some threshold, synergism
follows easily. But the initial state is inevitably below the threshold.
Figure 7 shows this threshold model for synergism. Once both partners are above
the threshold, mutually beneficial interactions strongly enhance the cooperative
traits. After enhancement by positive feedback, the partners may be investing heav-
ily in traits that benefit each other in order to receive enhanced return benefits. At
that point, the partners may become fully dependent on each other for survival. Once
above the threshold, the likely path is: complementation and positive feedback →
specialization→ irreversible transition to a highly integrated and cooperative state
(Eigen and Schuster, 1979).
How can partners pass the threshold? Suppose, initially, that the average traits of
the two populations are below the threshold. However, there is variability in each
population. So, by chance, some pairs of individuals will be above the threshold.
Those chance pairs will do better than average, because they gain the synergistic
benefit from their positive feedback on each other. Each will have more offspring
than average, spreading the cooperative trait values in their populations. However, if
their progeny associate randomly with partners, then on average they will be invest-
ing highly in cooperation but will be matched with partners who do not reciprocate.
So those cooperative progeny will do less well than average, and no net progress in
cooperative evolution ensues.
Spatial associations may help (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak et al., 1994).
Suppose, by chance, that a pair of cooperators comes together. They do well and
leave more progeny than average. If their progeny tend to associate rather than mix
randomly, then the synergism continues, and the paired lineages of cooperators ex-
pand. The spatial association, extended over time, allows the cooperative pairing to
continue long enough to increase significantly, possibly pushing the average trait
values over the threshold (Frank, 1994a, 1995b). Once the average values pass the
threshold, both populations rapidly enhance their synergistic traits, and the spatial
associations are no longer required.
Cells are membrane bound structures that naturally impose spatial associations
(Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry, 1995). Perhaps the spatial associations imposed by
the early cells helped to push various biochemical synergisms over their coopera-
tive thresholds. As those thresholds were passed, the mutual dependence between
molecules became fixed. At that point, the biochemical integration became so deep
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that we would have a hard time recognizing the self interested histories behind the
cohesive group.
T1
T2
Fig. 7 Thresold model for the origin and evolution of synergistic cooperation. Individuals of pop-
ulation 1 have a trait, T1, that enhances the reproductive rate of members of population 2, but the
trait that benefits the partner also reduces the actor’s own fitness. Likewise, members of population
2 have a trait, T2, that enhances the reproduction of individuals of population 1 at a cost to the actor.
Larger values of T provide more benefit to the partner at a higher cost to the donor. When both
populations have low trait values, as would be expected when the partners first meet, natural selec-
tion continually pushes the traits to lower values. If, however, the pair of traits is above a threshold
upon first meeting, then cooperation can increase because of synergistic feedback. Correlation in
the traits between populations increases the probability that a particular group will have a pair of
individuals above the threshold. Such correlation may arise from spatial associations. From Frank
(1995b).
4.4.2 Irreversible Thresholds in the Social Evolution of Insect Colonies
Positive feedback, historical change, and irreversibility may often play important
roles in the evolution of complex and highly integrated groups. In this section, I con-
sider Bourke’s (1999) interesting analysis of social insect colonies (Frank, 2003).
Although Bourke’s study transcends my simple models of synergism, his analysis
does emphasize strongly the role of positive feedback and irreversible thresholds in
cooperative evolution.
Bourke (1999) began by noting that, across different species of social insect,
small colonies tend to have relatively little morphological differentiation between
queens and workers. In addition, the workers have a relatively high degree of re-
productive potential. By contrast, large colonies tend to have strong morphological
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differentiation between queens and workers and reduced reproductive potential of
the workers.
Alexander et al. (1991) argued that in small colonies each worker has a significant
probability of replacing the queen because there are relatively few competitors. By
contrast, workers in large colonies have relatively little chance of succeeding to
become queen. Thus, workers in large colonies are favored to reduce investment
in reproductive potential and become more specialized for their worker roles. This
reduction leads to strong morphological differentiation between workers and queens
and low reproductive potential of workers. Absence of potential reproduction by
workers reduces conflict between workers and other colony members, because the
workers can enhance their fitness mostly by increasing the success of the colony.
Ratnieks and Reeve (1992) suggested that worker control of reproduction by
other workers (policing) may be ineffective in small colonies. If there are few other
workers, then a single worker may be able to dominate her neighbors and succeed
in producing sons. As the number of workers rises, policing becomes more effective
because a single worker cannot dominate the collective.
Bourke (1999) combined these ideas to argue that positive feedbacks occur be-
tween colony size, policing, reproductive potential of workers, and morphological
differentiation between workers and queens. As colony size rises, policing becomes
more effective, which favors reduced allocation to reproduction by workers. As
workers concentrate more on their colony-productive roles, conflict subsides and
the colony becomes more efficient. Greater efficiency may drive colonies to larger
size, further specializing workers for nonreproductive tasks and aligning the inter-
ests of the workers with the interests of the colony.
5 Historical Analogy
The tension between conflict and cooperation of self interested actors runs deeply
throughout the history of life. The great puzzles turn on how cooperative and effi-
cient groups arise solely through self interest. The same basic forces seem to occur
in both biology and in human affairs. I first recap the biology, then comment on the
analogy to humans.
In biology, the tragedy of the commons rules in the absence of any special force
that promotes cooperation. We see the tragedy of self interest everywhere: in sex
ratios, in parasite virulence, in bacterial secretion of resource-acquiring molecules.
In all cases, each member of a group would do better by promoting group cohesion
and sharing in the benefits of greater group efficiency. But, without some force that
curbs the free expression of self interest, competition within the group ultimately
plays against everyone’s interests.
Several forces in biology have overcome the tragedy to promote group cohe-
sion. Correlated behaviors tie the success of actors together by matching behavior
between partners and thus locking the success of the actor with its partner. If an
actor’s success is tied with its neighbors, then the value of group efficiency can
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dominate the disruptive force of self interested competition. In biology, correlated
behavior most often arises by common genetics from shared ancestry—that is, by
interactions between genetic kin. But any force that induces correlation can have the
same effect.
Repression of competition within groups ties the interests of each individual to
the group. With no opportunity to outcompete neighbors, each individual can gain
only by promoting the efficiency and productivity of the group. Any process that
randomizes the share of group resources provided to each individual effectively re-
presses any opportunity for competition. The way that individuals divide their ge-
netic material for transmission to offspring arose from a process of randomization,
in which the probability that a particular gene passes to a child is determined ran-
domly. We call this process fair meiosis—the basis throughout much of life for sex,
reproduction, inheritance, and individuality.
Repression of competition may also be important at higher levels of social orga-
nization. I discussed one study of a primate, in which dominant males police conflict
in the group. In the absence of those policing males, group cohesion deteriorated
significantly. Effective policing of competition may be difficult to achieve in many
biological settings. That difficulty explains why competition still rules much of life,
and why in certain cases the ubiquitous force of competition may be overcome.
Self interested valuation of others’ success arises naturally in biology through ge-
netic kinship. Observed patterns of behavior ultimately depend on the rate at which
competing behaviors are transmitted into the future. In this regard, an individual
is shaped by natural selection to value the success of another in proportion to the
correlation in their genetic tendency to pass the same behaviors on to future gener-
ations.
Regard for kin sets the foundation of social behavior. It is the reason parents care
for offspring, sterile honeybees raise their siblings, and nonreproductive skin cells
die to promote the success of sperm or egg. Kin correlations can shape behavior with
great precision. I illustrated that precision by the relative valuation a social insect
worker places on the queen’s sons versus the other workers’ sons. The class more
highly valued switches depending on how many times the queen mates. The workers
switch their treatment accordingly. When the workers are more closely correlated
genetically with other workers’ sons, they tolerate production of those sons without
interference. By contrast, when workers are more closely correlated genetically with
the queen’s sons, they destroy the sons produced by other workers.
Finally, synergistic feedback between different aptitudes often provides bene-
fit to both parties. I discussed how such synergism likely played a key role in the
earliest evolutionary history of life. At some early stage, there must have been a con-
sortium formed to produce the first cells. That consortium arose between separate
molecules, each originally designed to replicate itself but not to interact coopera-
tively with other molecules. Some of those self interested replicators probably had
synergistic biochemistry. The positive feedbacks combined with spatial associations
imposed by cellular boundaries set the first great cooperative transition of life. I also
discussed how such synergisms between complementary aptitudes shaped the his-
torical trends to greater specialization and complexity in social insect colonies.
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Correlated behaviors, repression of competition, other regarding valuation, and
synergistic gains between different aptitudes rule conflict and cooperation through-
out the history of life. The potential analogies with human behavior are clear.
But what is the value of such analogy between biology and human sociality? I
see two related benefits. First, study of biology has greatly clarified the logic of self
interest. I have, in this paper, outlined a rich theory of conflict and cooperation that
has succeeded well in explaining and in predicting diverse behaviors. Many of those
ideas from biology have arisen independently in the theory of games or in studies of
human behavior. But the biological theory has a firmer conceptual foundation and
greater connection with observed phenomena.
Second, analogies from nature suggest hypotheses about the forces that have
shaped human societies. For example, Alexander (1979, 1987) has argued that many
aspects of human morality turn on reducing competition between neighbors to pro-
mote group cohesion. Alexander developed his hypothesis from close study of biol-
ogy followed by analogy to human self interest.
How useful are such analogies in forming hypotheses about human sociality?
Certainly, both large mistakes and great insights may follow from analogy. Thus, one
can reasonably defend both caution and boldness. But caution cannot solve puzzles.
And many puzzles remain with regard to the forces that shape human cooperation
and competition.
6 Historical Consequence
Historical analogy simply provides a source of ideas about how self interest plays
out in human societies. By contrast, historical consequence means that humans have
been shaped by the same forces that have operated throughout biological history.
Such historical consequence still allows that humans are unique. From a strictly
biological perspective, humans have particular attributes that set us apart. For ex-
ample, other animals have culture and specialized cognitive abilities, but the great
development of human culture and cognition define qualitative distinctions of hu-
man sociality.
Thinking about historical consequence leads to obvious questions. How strongly
does genetic kinship shape behavior? How much does learning and culture alter the
dynamics of behavior? How much bias has biological history built into the way we
learn and transmit aspects of culture? How much does a history of group against
group competition align self interested tendencies with those of the group?
Biological history has had at least some consequential effects along these lines.
It simply does not make sense to suppose that history does not matter. But we still
do not know how to weigh various factors. How should we proceed to learn more?
One approach is to consider the following question (Alexander, 1990): What was
the most important challenge to survival and reproduction that caused evolution to
transform our ancestors from something like a chimpanzee into a modern human?
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To start, consider how biologists think about evolutionary transformation in re-
sponse to challenges of survival and reproduction. It is easier to see the structure of
the argument if we begin with a nonhuman example. I use kangaroos. I describe the
example in detail, because it is essential to understand the biological approach to
analyzing evolutionary transformations. After I finish with the kangaroo example, I
apply the same logic to the evolutionary transformation of humans from their ape
ancestors.
Most of the 63 species of kangaroo make their living on the ground. Those ground
dwelling species include the large well-known hoppers. However, at least 10 species
of kangaroo belong to a group that has become specialized for life in the trees (Flan-
nery et al., 1996). Adaptation for tree life led to several specialized characteristics.
The key here is that a single broad challenge—moving from the ground into the
trees—explains a wide array of evolutionary changes to deal with the challenge. We
will want to discuss what sort of challenge and what sort of changes characterize the
evolutionary transformation of humans from ape ancestors. But first, let use consider
the kangaroos. Diamond (1997) has described the characteristic changes so well that
I quote directly:
The lifestyle of arboreal tree-kangaroos required them to reverse millions of years of kan-
garoo evolution in many respects: saving weight by a 25 per cent reduction in muscle mass;
developing long, strong, curved claws; big, powerful grasping forearms, and a rotator cuff
in the shoulder (shared with humans but not with other kangaroos or most other mammals)
to permit overhead use of the forearm; hind-feet that twist so that the soles can face each
other to grasp a tree trunk; hair whorls to shed rain (also shared with humans); and a tail
tufted with long fur in some species, used as a counterbalance in climbing and as a rudder
in ‘flight’.
Those ‘flights’ are actually jumps to the ground from a height of 20 metres or more
in the canopy. I know of no other big mammal that survives drops from such height . . .
the animals’ bones, muscles and ligaments must have become modified to withstand such
shocks.
. . . Faced with a hard-to-digest, toxic, bulky leaf diet of low nutritional value, tree-
kangaroos evolved a low metabolic rate. They decrease rather than increase their metabolic
rate at low ambient temperature; spend 90 per cent of their time ‘doing nothing’ (that is,
sitting and digesting); and have a complex stomach of several chambers, and regurgitate
and rechew food, like cows chewing the cud.
The logic for tree kangaroos is simple. They moved from the ground to the trees:
that move defined the central evolutionary challenge. Nearly all of the particular
changes that separate tree kangaroos from those on the ground can be explained by
evolutionary response to the key challenge.
We need to consider two steps in order to apply this same logic to humans. First,
what are the particular characteristics that separate humans from their ape ancestors?
This list of characteristics defines the changes that need to be explained. People
argue over the exact limits of the differences, for example, how much symbolic
processing chimpanzees and gorillas can accomplish. But in the end, these are more
or less matters of fact that can be resolved by direct study.
Nonetheless, any direct statement about humans is likely to be controversial.
Here is just one example of certain potentially unique traits of humans (Alexander
1990):
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Humans are the only mammal that lives in multi-male groups, in which confidence (likeli-
hood) of paternity is high . . . and the males are both extensively and complexly parental and
also extensively and complexly cooperative with one another (and in which, I speculate, the
males with the highest confidence of paternity also tend to be the most cooperative.)
In the second step, we formulate a hypothesis: What is the central evolutionary
challenge that allows us to make sense of the particular evolutionary transformations
that separate humans from ape ancestors?
Many theories have been proposed. Several emphasize the social environment.
Again, I give just one brief account to indicate the way in which one may argue.
Alexander (1990) gives a full scholarly discussion of past work and presents his
own views as follows:
. . . At some point in their evolution humans obviously began to cooperate to compete . . .
this intergroup competition becoming increasingly elaborate, direct, and continuous until
it achieved the ubiquity with which it has been exhibited in modern humans throughout
recorded history across the entire face of the earth . . . This unique kind of within-species
balance-of-power race—involving, eventually, virtually all levels, or group sizes, within
societies—would be a perpetual or unending one . . . in which rapidly appearing differences
in culture and technology could become significant unbalancers that could accelerate the
process even further. It could be termed a case of “runaway social selection”. . . [calling]
for adversarial and competing groups of humans to be central in creating the environment
of brain and psyche selection. Unprecedented levels of cooperation within groups could
thereby be generated, as well as unprecedented kinds of between-group adversarial rela-
tionships.
These points establish the problem of historical consequence. One may follow
this problem in many directions. But, whatever direction, we can be sure that the
concepts of self interested cooperation will play an important role in framing the
key evolutionary challenge and the particular historical consequences for distinctly
human characteristics.
It is, of course, possible that multiple factors explain the human transformation—
different human characteristics may have different, unrelated explanations. But I
follow Michael Ghiselin (1969) in his analysis of Darwin’s greatness: above all,
Darwin succeeded by his stubborn belief that a few simple processes explain much
of the great complexity and variety of life. To discover a simple explanation, one
must assume that a simple explanation is possible.
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